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Introduction 
This article aims to offer a brief analysis of the way Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) governments in Turkey (2002-) have been related to the civil society. 
In order to do so it relies on Turkey’s recent history of the past three decades, treating the 
2000s not as a break with, but as a continuity of the political developments of the 1980s and 
1990s. This does not mean that the AKP itself as a political party and the AKP governments 
as the carriers of neoliberal-conservative alliance that marked Turkey’s experience with 
neoliberalism, do not represent changes in the country’s socio-political portrait. On the 
contrary, the past decade in Turkey is best characterized by rapid changes in terms of the 
state and social structure (Coşar and Yücesan-Özdemir 2012).  Yet these changes did not 
take place suddenly, but emerged out of the political unfolding of neoliberal structuration 
process that reached its zenith, and thus consolidation phase during the AKP years. The 
same process also hosted the rise of civil societal activism in Turkey. Starting with the late 
1980s civil society emerged as the safe grounds for citizens’ involvement first in social issues 
and then in political matters. The 1990s witnessed the heyday of civil society with significant 
increase in the number of civil society organizations and their capacity to reach out the 
national borders, which positively effected their potential to influence the policy making 
process.  
In this framework the article focuses on the AKP’s stance with respect to civil societal 
activism. The main topics of interest are related to the party’s policy preferences regarding 
the social sphere—gender policies and social policies. Here the link between civil societal 
activism and the party’s policy preferences in the social sphere hints at the connection 
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between citizenship and civil societal activism. I would argue that civil societal activism as an 
asset of citizenship participation has been one of the main means of opposition against the 
AKP’s neoliberal implementations in the social sphere. In parallel, the AKP governments’ 
reaction against the citizens’ activism in the civil societal sphere has so far hinted at the 
increasing authoritarianism at the governmental level. It is no secret that during its 
foundation period and in its first term in government (2002-2007) AKP had initially adopted 
a liberal pluralist discourse that referred to dialogue, tolerance and negotiation, recalling a 
consistent interaction with civil society organizations in the policy making process (Coşar and 
Özman, 2004). Yet as the party has guaranteed its power base—both in institutional and 
social terms—the conservative-cum-authoritarian tones in its discourse and policy making 
style have increased. This can be observed in the AKP’s discourse concerning the opposition 
against its policies in the social sphere as well as its style of approaching to—and/or 
dismissing with—civil societal voices, specifically the feminist voices. Considering that the 
AKP has never denied its moralistic outlook in matters concerning the gender order in the 
country the party’s increasing distaste of feminist politics is not unexpected (Coşar and 
Yeğenoğlu, 2011).  
The article is composed of three parts. In the first part, I offer a brief historical outline of the 
neoliberal restructuration process in Turkey with a view to the rise and unfolding of civil 
societal activism in Turkey through the late 1980s and 1990s, with special reference to 
women’s movements. In the second part, I concentrate on the evolution of women’s 
rights/feminist activism in Turkey through the free-marketization of civil society. In the same 
part, I also take issue with the shift in AKP’s political identity and discourse from a liberal 
pluralist line to a moralistic point that increasingly excludes and marginalizes feminist 
demands. In the third and concluding part I outline the current state of AKP’s politics with its 
implications for the fragile link between civil society and democracy in Turkey.  In pursuing 
my arguments I employ a feminist historico-critical reading of the AKP’s record in Turkey’s 
politics. My reading can be categorized as qualitative historical analysis, based on primary 
and secondary sources—public declarations by the prominent members of the AKP, related 
governmental documents, and research that have been conducted on the AKP’s policy 
preferences, so far.  
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Historical backdrop: Civil societalism in a militaristic socio-political 
configuration  
Despite all the ambiguities and controversies in the literature on civil society it is possible to 
start with a broad generalization to understand the rise of civil societalism in the late 1980s 
in Turkey.3 In its most general sense the notion civil society refers to voluntary involvement 
of individuals-as-citizens in socio-political issues more or less through daily practices.4 The 
dividing line appears when one considers the attributes of the individual in civil societal 
engagement, the discursive practice of citizenship in a specific socio-political context, and 
the way individuals get organized to tackle with the socio-political issues at hand. As for the 
Turkish context, it is possible to note that civil society in its most general conceptualization 
has always been included in the political agenda, though changing in accordance with the 
specific configuration of the individual-citizen nexus, which certainly depends on the socio-
political dynamics of the period in question. 
Civil society organizations in the form of foundations, associations and trade unions had 
been active in channeling the citizens’ involvement in matters concerning the public outside 
the party politics throughout the Republican era (1923-). Yet civil societalism as a discursive 
practice would emerge as late as the end of the 1980s, in a rather ironic style: emphasis on 
the political value of civil societal organizations would rise in the immediate aftermath of the 
1980 coup d’état and the following three-year long military regime (1980-1983), under the 
first post-coup civilian government of the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP). Irony 
is revealed when one considers the continuity of the coup measures in the strict delimitation 
on political participation in the same period. At a time when the ban on political parties and 
actors of the previous decade still continued the calls from the ruling elite to enhance civil 
societal engagement might seem odd. This should be understood with a view to the 
dominant imagination of civil society among the governing cadres of the time and the 
implications of this imagination in real politics. 
The late 1980s, when the emphasis on civil society was an asset of the governmental 
agendas, were marked with the transition from the military-dominated neoliberalization 
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process to one where civilian governments started to assume the leading role as the actors 
in tailoring the socio-political space in accordance with the neoliberal requisites. The 1980 
coup d’état and the ensuing military regime had been functional in preparing the political 
landscape for the introduction of neoliberal policies in the country. In this respect, especially 
the leftist opposition with considerable experience in organized political activism was 
curbed. Besides the ban on the political parties and actors—held responsible for the socio-
political turmoil of the second half of the 1970s—membership to political parties was 
required to meet strict conditions, set by the military, and the political parties were banned 
from forming branches with societal extensions. In parallel, the political parties—which were 
permitted to function on the grounds that they had no connections with the banned political 
parties—were subjected to the military’s approval for eligibility to participate in the first 
post-coup general election (1983). The ANAP, which assumed power as the party to form the 
first civilian government in 1983 was in tandem with the post-1980 political priorities, set by 
the coup leaders (Coşar and Özman 2007). 
ANAP’s conformity to the post-1980 criteria was best exemplified in its claim that the party 
had no connections with the marginal—read as ideological—stances of the past decade.  The 
party positioned itself with respect to the centre space, proclaiming the centre identity. The 
centrist formula fitted into the dominant political imagination of the 1980s, connoting a 
depoliticized and de-ideologized political stance. In the coming decades the ANAP would be 
identified with the centre-right line in the political spectrum pointing at “mildness”5 in terms 
of nationalism, conservatism, religiosity and a strict adherence to free market economics, 
understood in the neoliberal frame. Yet the party’s disclaim of the connections with 
marginal political stances of the 1970s did not count for the connections with the 
Intellectuals’ Hearth—the intellectual branch of the extreme nationalist party of the 1970s, 
Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP). The founding chair of the ANAP, 
Turgut Özal, personally embraced the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis of the Hearth as a building 
block of his party (Mert 2001: 69). The seeming contradiction in the emphasis on centre 
identity with no ideological extensions to the past on the one hand, and its overt affiliation 
with Turkish-Islamic synthesis, on the other hand, can be understood with a view to the 
militaristic dynamics of the period. While the original holders of the Synthesis—the extreme 
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nationalists who were organized in and/or affiliated with the MHP—were either imprisoned 
or banned from active political involvement, Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was first promoted 
through the measures taken under the military regime and then pursued by the ANAP 
throughout the 1980s. As Tanıl Bora (1999: 127, quoted in Coşar 2011) underlines, ANAP’s 
terms in government that marked the second half of the 1980s witnessed the “elevation of 
religion to the status of the ‘hardest’ element of national culture.” Through the 1980s, first 
by the military regime and then by the ANAP governments Sunni Islam was gradually 
included in the political discourse and practice at the state level. Though in Republican 
history Sunni Islam has always been the prominent religion both at the societal—the 
majority of the citizens in Turkey are supposed to be Sunni Muslims—and institutional 
levels—the Presidency of Religious Affairs is part of the state—until the 1980s, it was treated 
as a passive component of national identity and was kept under the strict control of the 
state. With the 1980 turn Sunni Islam was gradually integrated into the state ideology and 
political agenda of the centre politics, the latter representing the dominant political stance 
of the coming decades. 
The civil societal discourse was pushed to the agenda in such a milieu. ANAP with its centrist 
identity, embraced nationalism, conservatism with the motifs of religiosity, social democracy 
and liberalism (Kalaycıoğlu 2002: 45). The last ingredient connoted the party’s pro-free 
market stance and support for the flourishing of civil societal activity in Turkey. It can be 
argued that the enthusiasm of the ruling elite for civil societal activities pointed at 
alternative venues and styles of engagement with politics that can be controlled so as not to 
threaten the neoliberal structuration process. While the narrowing down of the political 
space with a concern to preempt structural opposition—mainly from the Left—offered the 
grounds for the neoliberal policy makers to take the necessary measures with ease, the 
emphasis on carving out opportunities for civil societal organizations was associated with the 
social transformation in terms of the free-marketization of society. In this respect, civil 
society, understood in individualistic terms was an apt alternative to organized political 
activism of the past decades. Ironically, two political strands came forth in manipulating this 
opportunity space: Islamist movement and women’s movement. Considering the space that 
was configured for religion in the new socio-political setting it is no surprise that Islamist 
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movement benefited more from the civil societal discourse. The women’s movement, on the 
other hand, successfully manipulated the dynamics of the period to escape from the political 
restrictions in forging out the grounds for feminist political opposition of the next two 
decades.6   
The women’s movement in Turkey, which could manipulate the de-politicization process in 
the country started to organize independently of existing patriarchal political stances. The 
feminists did so through informal gatherings in small groups. It can be argued that despite 
the continuing restrictions on political participation the feminists could organize in 
autonomous structures, problematizing such issues, deemed “private” in the dominant 
patriarchal gaze, as sexual freedom, violence against women in all its facets, and 
discrimination at the workplace (Bora and Günal 2002). Clearly starting from the “personal is 
political” argument, the feminists could raise these issues first through the consciousness-
raising groups, and afterwards through public campaigns. Though feminists in the late 1980s 
were acting on seemingly apolitical issues, according to Sirman (1989: 29) they still had to 
watch out the police force under the riot control regulations. The issue-based cooperation in 
a non-hierarchical, and ad hoc style (Sirman 1989: 19) on the basis of which they could 
organize and act in the late-1980s evolved into institutionalization toward gender-
mainstreaming throughout the 1990s. In the authoritarian milieu of the 1980s, which they 
could—ironically—manipulate to organize independently of the grand ideological narratives 
around feminist concerns, the feminists were also keen on keeping their negative attitude 
toward the state (Coşar and Gençoğlu-Onbaşı 2008: 330). By the institutionalization process 
in the 1990s, certainly with exceptions, they started to get into dialogue with the state 
(Kardam and Ertürk 1999: 176-180). Similar to the 1980s, the 1990s, too, were characterized 
with contradictory developments in terms of authoritarian state policies and civil societalism 
as a discursive strategy on the part of the governments.  While those socio-political issues 
that were deemed to be a concern of national security were treated with authoritarian 
responses on the part of the state, the women’s movement could find opportunity spaces 
for gender mainstreaming. Exemplary is the foundation of the Directorate General on the 
Status and Problems of Women (Kadının Statüsü ve Sorunları Genel Müdürlüğü, KSGM),7 
which offered a venue for the women’s rights organizations to push for governmental 
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measures to fight against violence against women and gender equality. It is certain that the 
relations between the related organizations and the Directorate have not always been 
harmonious but nevertheless, starting with the late 1990s, positive outcomes could be 
observed, as in the case of legal amendments that aimed at eliminating violence against 
women—specifically domestic violence—and such symbolic acts by the ratification of 
international conventions against violence against women.8 
 
Civil societalization of feminist politics and the AKP’s neoliberal 
authoritarianism 
 
Although the women’s movement in Turkey could retain the leverage that it had gradually 
forged through two decades, by the 2000s, it had to confront the authoritarian side of the 
neoliberal coin. This is not to say that starting with the late 1980s it was the women’s 
movement which had the maximum benefits of the structural transformation process. On 
the contrary, the neoliberalization of the country has posed vital hindrances to the 
achievement of gender equality since it has worked through patriarchal means. 
Nevertheless, feminist activists have tactfully played in the niches of the contradictory 
workings of the transformation process through the late 1980s and the 1990s. However, 
with the consolidation phase of Turkey’s neoliberalization the niches were started to be 
filled in by the power elite, this time not with liberal calls for participation in the civil sphere 
on individual grounds but with conservative morals.  
 
The AKP’s terms in power, almost two decades after the initial steps had been taken to the 
neoliberalization of society through the ironic co-existence of authoritarian policies and civil 
societalism among the ruling elite should be read with a view to this historical backdrop. The 
party had started with a “synthesizing discourse”, reminiscent of the ANAP, when claiming 
power during its foundation (2001) and during its first term in government (2002-2007). The 
party had defined itself with reference to “conservative democracy” and reformism. In its 
policy preferences it adhered to neoliberal requisites, continuing with the Strong Economic 
Program, devised by Kemal Derviş, the technocratic minister of the then coalition 
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government, composed of Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti), ANAP and MHP 
(1999-2001). It persistently referred to democracy, tolerance, differences and societal peace 
in addresing the populace and in grounding its policy preferences. In the same period the 
party utilized the emphasis on civil society, understood in liberal terms, as a way to prove its 
democratic identity (Gençoğlu-Onbaşı 2010: 201). In practice, the pluralist stance turned out 
to be a preferential treatment of civil society organizations. In this treatment two persistent 
features of AKP’s identity have been decisive: the party’s commitment to neoliberal program 
and conservative morals. To put it more clearly, while emphasizing the political value of civil 
society as a sphere ensuring “widest possible consultation and consensus” (Gençoğlu-Onbaşı 
2010: 200) the party has embraced ANAP’s approach, “identifying civil society first and 
foremost with the private sector” (Coşar and Özman 2004: 64).  Yet, the reference to 
democracy, tolerance, differences and societal peace would gradually fade away in the 
aftermath of the party’s first term in government.  
 
In the AKP’s discursive practices two traits have persisted throughout its life-time: neoliberal 
measures and conservative morals. The unfolding of governmental policies embracing 
conservative morals under the AKP governments was managed through the neoliberal 
agenda. As might be expected, this persistence directly affected the party’s positioning vis-á-
vis civil society organizations. Civil society proved to be both the discursive tool and the 
material sphere that the AKP manipulated in consolidating its power. The handset that the 
party used in its initial years in power was not brand new, but was handed over by the 
neoliberal structuration process since the late 1980s. The neoliberal distinction between the 
social and economic spheres, and the neoliberal conceptualization of politics-as-
administration that has gained currency in the second half of the 1980s and throughout the 
1990s, reveals this legacy. Here, politics-as-administration formula corresponds to the 
technocratic understanding of politics—i.e., policy-making and implementation in terms of 
managerial problem-solving mentality. This understanding, expectedly, operates through the 
marginalization of political participation in deciding about socio-political matters, handing 
over the resolution of issues to the specialists and experts. Nilüfer Göle’s (1993:213) analysis 
of ANAP as a “…policy—rather than politics-oriented [party, which] … defined its identity in 
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terms of pragmatic rather than ideological values” summarizes this understanding. A parallel 
mentality can be observed in the words of Tansu Çiller, the incumbent chairperson of the 
center-right True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi) and the prime minister between 1993 and 
1996: “I pursue above politics policy… I promised not to engage in politics. … I entrusted 
myself to the people. I work for them. I do not engage in politics” (Cited in Coşar and Özman 
2007: 212). 
 
The distinction between the social and the economic spheres has been conceptualized in 
terms of the distinction between the person and the individual. As prevalent through 
different versions of neoliberalization worldwide, the individual—portrayed in terms of the 
will and capacity to seek her/his own benefits, rationality to make accurate cost-benefit 
analysis, and the liberty to possess and accumulate—is assumed to be located in the 
economic sphere—monopolized by the idealization of free market.  The person, on the other 
hand, is derived from the conservative tradition pointing at the neoliberal imagination of 
society through familialism.9 This matrix reveals the neoliberal-conservative alliance over the 
sustenance of free-market mechanisms. “[N]eoliberal rationality” concedes to “the 
moralism, statism and authoritarianism of neoconservatism”, giving way to “the profoundly 
anti-democratic ideas and culture to take root in the culture and the subject” (Brown 2006: 
702).  The inner contradiction—between the emphasis on the individual and the person—
can be observed in the implications of this rather simple distinction for policy practice: the 
separation, so far, could not work at the level of practice, since the neoliberal policies that 
are deemed to be based on it signified the extension of the private sphere so as to embrace 
both the social and the economic. Despite the seeming clarity in the distinction between the 
social—read as the space outside the economic and the political matters in general, and 
gradually with reference to the family in particular—and the economic—read as the space of 
free-market—in practice it turned out to be the economization-cum-free marketization—
and thus privatization—of every individual and/or collective activity. This shift of spaces and 
the liquidation of everything into the economic mentality were achieved through three 
decades of neoliberal discourse and related policies, especially those concerning social rights 
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and gender-based claims. Unsurprisingly, the most vivid examples can be observed under 
the AKP’s terms in government. 
 
The AKP’s new social security law (Law No.: 5510; Date: 2006) solidified the discursive and 
practical attempts for the reorganization of public expenditure on social services throughout 
the three decades. The law was promoted as a remedy to the deteriorating regulations on 
social security, and as a means to standardize the social services through individual rights 
and liberties. The key phrase here is individual rights and liberties, in that while justifying the 
liquidation of the rights as social—and thus public—matters the law further called the 
individual to take responsibility of her/his health and physical security, in the most general 
sense of the term. In other words, the new law was based on a reading of citizenship with 
reference to the individual of the free market, which in turn tends to relieve the state of its 
responsibility to ensure equal social rights within the wider scope of citizenship rights. This 
reading of citizenship might seem to contradict with the fact that the related legislation 
established the state’s responsibility to contribute to the social security system. Yet as the 
system has so far proceeded, this contribution has proved to be realized at a very low level. 
This contradiction is further resolved when the specific measures adopted by the law are 
taken into account. Through the new regulations the retirement age is raised, the 
contribution period is extended, and retirement, disability, and survivor benefits are 
reduced. As for women’s rights specifically, the law includes a measure that further deepens 
women’s disadvantaged social position. The current regulations do not entail egalitarian 
measures, but position the women in the labor market on the same competitive grounds 
with men—which in essence means negative discrimination against women—while at the 
same time reinforce women’s domestic labor, deepening women’s double servitude (Coşar 
and Yeğenoğlu 2009). The most recent acknowledgement of this state of affairs can be 
observed in the President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s words: “You cannot make woman and 
man equal. This is against creation. Because they are different by creation” (“Kadın Erkek 
Eşitliği Fıtrata Ters” Hürriyet 2014).  
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The account above summarizes just a small part of an holistic transformation process in 
Turkey. Such legal regulations, tending toward the dissolution of social rights into individual 
matters are accompanied by an accelerating decrease in women’s participation in the 
workforce throughout the AKP’s terms in office, and an increase in the conservative tune in 
the AKP governments’ policy preferences. Though seemingly contradictory, the co-existence 
of the individualizing tendency in the liquidation of social rights and the increase in socio-
political conservatism points at a fine synthesis for the working of the neoliberal order of 
things. This synthesis is manifest in the AKP’s gender policies. The AKP’s terms in office 
witnessed the rise of a new mode of patriarchy in Turkey: neoliberal-conservative patriarchy 
(Yeğenoğlu and Coşar 2012). In this new mode of patriarchy, women are still considered as 
natural assets of the familial sphere, while at the same time they are called to participate in 
the labor market—as the most easily accessible cheap labor force. In so doing, the party 
regularly sends warnings signaling the dangers that worklife pose for women’s familial 
responsibilities. The notorious “family package,” composed of legal regulations organizing 
women’s place in the labor force and in the family is a vivid expression of this conservative 
mood. Designed as the Program for Protection of Family and Dynamic Population (January 
2015) (Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığı 2015), the regulations combine the adjustment of 
women’s labor force to flexible labor market conditions with reference to achieving harmony 
between worklife and family life. However, as elaborated in the press declaration by Kadın 
Emeği ve İstihdamı Girişimi (Initiative for Women’s Labor and Employment) (February 17, 
2015), the program can be considered as another example of forcing the women into the 
flexible working conditions through familial roles, while at the same time prioritizing the 
patriarchal family structure as the essential reference for women’s natural roles. Considering 
that the family has also been deemed to be a social security institution in Turkey under the 
AKP governments (ASAGEM 2008: 8), the program hints at the dismissal with feminist claims 
for women’s socio-economic rights. Here, the neoliberal separation between the social and 
the economic spheres becomes once more salient. The conceptualization of family both as 
the natural sphere for women and as an asset for social solidarity blurs the distinction 
between the individual of the free market and the person of the social sphere, actually 
underlying the unease inherent in such a distinction.  
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At this point, it is apt to argue that this seeming contradiction in the AKP’s neoliberal 
discursive policies is resolved in the conceptualization of citizenship with respect to the 
public and private spheres.  As elaborated by Nalan Soyarık-Şentürk (2012), AKP’s socio-
political transformation record included a new phase of citizenization process characterized 
by a hesitant mix of neoliberal, nationalist and religious motifs. However, this hesitancy does 
not count for the exclusion of social rights from the scope of the policies related to the re-
definition and re-construction of citizenship-as-a-status. Considering that civil societal 
organization and activism are directly linked to citizenship—notwithstanding the contention 
in the literature on civil society that civil society is broadly conceptualized as the sphere of 
citizens’ involvement in social and political matters outside the institutional political 
organizations—it is possible to note that this exclusion lays the grounds for the relegation of 
civil society into the economic sphere. 
 
As noted above, neither the separation between the social and the economic nor the 
relegation of civil society to the economic sphere emerged as brand new developments 
during the AKP’s terms in government. Rather, the rise of civil society in the late 1980s as the 
sphere for citizens’ involvement in social and political matters and as a matter of individual 
rights and liberties, was basically managed through the free-market discourse. What 
distinguishes the AKP is that its rule marked the consolidation phase of this frame. As the 
party has consistently proved its victory through three general elections (2002, 2007, 2011) 
and local elections (2004, 2009, 2014), and finally in the presidential election (2014), in 
contradistinction to its first years in government it consistently distanced itself from the 
pluralist discourse, tending toward an increasingly selective and exclusionary approach 
toward civil society organizations. In so doing, the AKP has manipulated the neoliberal 
separation between the social and the economic. This is most manifest in the party’s 
disawoval of feminist organizations in relating to the civil societal sphere. In this denial, both 
neoliberal measures and conservative morals are at work.  
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First, the neoliberal frame has so far offered a convenient venue for the governments to 
draw a tolerant and negotiation oriented portrait in their approach to civil societal actors. It 
did so by redesigning the political space in terms of administration. Briefly, civil society in the 
neoliberal frame is meant to be located in a quasi-free-market space, outside what is 
deemed to be political. The feminist organizing in the post-1980 era manipulated this 
formula in laying the grounds for feminist political involvement in the coming decades. In the 
1990s, women’s rights and feminist organizations used the opportunity to contact with state 
institutions in pushing for women-friendly legislation and gender mainstreaming. In so doing 
they benefitted from the international bodies and transnational feminist activism (Aldikacti-
Marshall 2009). However, by the consolidation-cum-crisis phase of neoliberalization in the 
2000s, the convenience seems to have come to a halt. For, the crisis phase also hosted the 
ongoing conservatization.  
 
In a milieu where politics has long been defined in technical terms and where citizenship 
participation through civil societal activism has gradually been subjected to free-market 
dynamics, feminist politics, nevertheless, could carve out a space for women’s solidarity. 
Certainly this has not been without a cost—feminists, too, had to play in the language of 
free-market in terms of fund-raising, issue-setting, and campaining. As the state funding, 
which had already been scarce when it came to “women’s demands,” almost completely 
diminished for feminist organizations,10 and considering the insufficiency of membership 
fees, the latter had to rely on projects not only for dealing with specific socio-political issues 
but also—and rather uneasily—for survival. In other words, feminist organizations 
themselves have never been immune to the neoliberal order of things. On the contrary, the 
initial capacity to manipulate neoliberal de-politicization process in the late 1980s seems to 
have turned into a risk of articulation into the neoliberal civil societal engagement as 
project-based activity (Coşar and Gençoğlu-Onbaşı 2008; Bora 2006; Sirman 2006; Üstündağ 
2006). In other words, the permeation of project-based mentality in dealing with women’s 
issues among women’s rights and feminist organizations risks solidarity by turning the 
activisits into competitors for funding (Coşar and Özkan-Kerestecioğlu forthcoming in 2015).  
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The neoliberal frame also pacified the holistic potential of feminist civil societal activism. The 
neoliberal design of the political space as administrative business requires taking the issues 
of socio-political concern as partial matters with no necessary connections while at the same 
time preventing the calls for holistic approach to seemingly diverse socio-political problems. 
This style has dominated the governmental mentality in Turkey since the 1980s: dividing the 
interconnected socio-political matters into separate spheres, and hence preempting the 
possibility of structural opposition. It also pushed women’s civil societal activism to 
specialization which works in parallel to project-based activism. As Coşar and Özkan-
Kerestecioğlu (forthcoming in 2015) argue the infiltration of project mentality side by side 
with specialization has been functional in side-stepping the holistic demands of feminist 
political activism into issue-based areas of activity (cf. Üstündağ 2006 for the possibilities of 
the manipulation of project-based activism by feminist concerns). 
 
This side-stepping has been further enhanced through consistent appeal to conservative 
morals in the AKP’s discursive policies. The AKP has been tactful in locating its consistent 
conservative stance into the neoliberal order of things during its terms in government. It is 
no secret that the party has had a negative stance to the F-word even when it played in the 
language of tolerance and negotiation. The neoliberal separation between the individual—of 
the market—and the person—of the society eased the normalization of AKP’s conservative 
policies in social and political spheres. In this matrix, civil society as a sphere of citizens’ 
socio-political involvement is put into a rather ambiguous spot between the market and 
state—as the administrative unit. Those instances of civil societal activism, which carried the 
potential to go beyond the borders drawn by the market-state nexus—as feminist activism—
are doomed to hit the conservative enclosures through marginalization and/or 
demonization. This was evinced in the government’s violent response to the Gezi Resistance 
that started in May 2013. 
 
The Gezi Resistance sparked a flow of spontaneous citizenship-based opposition in the 
country throughout the summer of 2013, which can be linked to civil societal activism. The 
resistance persisted in the face of increasing police violence. Despite the extent of the 
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divergence among the participants in terms of political identity and ideological affiliation the 
common grounds was forged around rights-based claims: right to the city, right to organize, 
right to protest. The AKP’s strategy in countering the resistance was first marginalizing the 
citizens who participated in the resistance, and then monsterizing them. In parallel to the 
government’s ongoing labeling of feminists as “a few marginals” and feminism as a threat to 
the traditional Turkish norms and morals,11  the Gezi dissidents have been labeled as looters 
and/or traitors by the then prime minister Erdoğan (President of the Republic as of August 
2014). The combination of a marginalizing/monsterizing discourse with police violence 
attests the neoliberal authoritarianism that defines AKP’s rule in contemporary Turkey. In 
this rule, the formula seems simple: civil society is meant to stay within the limits of the free-
market so as not to pose a risk to the existing neoliberal order, and in case some civil society 
organizations and/or citizens attempt to go beyond the free-market and tresspass the 
politics-as-administration, they are doomed to face with the authoritarian hand of the 
government. 
 
Concluding remarks: Civil society inbetween activism, the state, and 
the free-market  
In the discussion between Bryan S. Turner and Jeffrey C. Alexander on the meaning and 
significance of civil society, the focus of attention is on the definition of citizenship in a 
specific polity, and relatedly the relative positioning of the state and citizens, as well as the 
connection among them. The lines of argument that Turner and Alexander develop tends to 
converge on the necessity that the holders of the monopoly of power should be subjected to 
the control of the citizenry. While Turner dismisses with the possibilities that civil society 
might offer for the practice of this control, Alexander insists on the necessity of civil sphere 
for the active involvement of citizens in the polity through civil society. In this frame of 
argument, civil society is considered—in its widest sense—to be the field where citizens 
organize voluntarily and autonomously—from the state—in matters they think they have a 
say (See Turner, 2008; Alexander, 2008).12  
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The current state of institutional politics in Turkey risks developing an academic discussion 
on civil society to turn into a futile attempt. As the AKP has proceeded to become 
increasingly authoritarian in approaching the social opposition, and conservative in 
approaching the society at large the civil society as a venue for citizens’ participation in 
everyday politics has turned out to be more of a utopia. On the other hand, the citizens’ 
persistent opposition—mainly on the basis of the right to city, but not restricted to it—to the 
AKP government’s policy preferences especially since the start of the Gezi Resistance hint at 
the possibilities to counter the authoritarianization and increasing conservatism. The Gezi 
Resistance is symbolic in the sense that it revealed the ambiguous state of civil societal 
politics in Turkey. The same holds true for feminist politics—as part of the resistance (Coşar 
and Özkan-Kerestecioğlu forthcoming in 2015).  
 
The ambiguity starts with the definition of civil society, or put differently, according to those 
organizations that are deemed to reside in the civil societal sphere by the state. According to 
the report by the Balkan Civil Society Acquis (2014) Turkish law lacks clarity and 
comprehensiveness in defining the civil society organizations. More briefly, only 
“associations and foundations are recognized as civil society organizations” (Balkan Civil 
Society Acquis 2014: 17). Platforms, initiatives, and collectives, which represent significant 
forms of feminist organizing, are not legally recognized as civil societal organization. Besides, 
those citizens’ initiatives that emerge on rights-based claims—as in the case of Gezi 
Resistance and in its follow-up—and embrace diverse political stances—both with 
organizational identity and on an individual basis—fall outside the official view of civil 
societal activism. Side by side with the legal restrictions,13 financial limitations and the 
discretionary power of the police forces, which hinder civil societal activities especially when 
they run counter to governmental preferences, those formations that are not recognized as 
civil society organizations complicates the state of civil society. Basically the question lingers: 
where should one locate those activisms that fall outside the free-market and/or contradict 
with the state and government with rights-based claims? 
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Current state of politics in Turkey does not offer clues for this question. For the official 
discourse toward any socio-political opposition to the governmental policy record is either 
condemned as monstrous or defined in terms of terror—i.e., as a threat to the state. On the 
other plane, already well-established and legally defined civil society organizations—
including the feminist associations and foundations—are pushed to play in the rules of free-
market, thus to a constant search for funding through projects. The rest is also forced to 
linger between the principles of citizens’ right to participation and autonomy, on the one 
hand, and coming to terms with the structural hindrances for survival on the other hand. In 
other words, the issue of civil society is not limited to the strong state tradition versus weak 
civil society formula as it is widely assumed (İçduygu 2007; Gençoğlu-Onbaşı 2010); it is 
rather a matter of the way citizenship-state-free-market nexus is organized. It can be argued 
that under the AKP’s rule for more than a decade the nexus is organized on the basis of free-
market mentality where the state acts as the regulator of the flow of capital, and the citizen 
is bifurcated into separate identities as the individual and the person, depending on the 
spheres that s/he is supposed to stay. The rights-based claims that are voiced through civil 
societal sphere are deemed to be threatening to this organization, and for the time being, 
are met not by the free-market rules nor by citizenship rights, but by authoritarian state 
policies and conservative morals that have become prevalent in everyday politics. 
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 Hacettepe University 
3
 On the contested nature of the conceptualization of civil society see, for example, Alexander 2008; Turner 
2008; Yerasimos, Seufert and Vorhoff 2000; Flyvbjerg 1998; Beckmann 1997; Hann and Dunn 1996; Keane 
1993.  
4
 For the ambiguities in the definition of the concept with a view to Turkey’s political history see Gençoğlu-
Onbaşı 2005 and Şimşek 2004.  
5
 Nur Vergin defines center right as “that platform formed by people who avoid excess… these are people who 
search for “sound” [policies]. Sound, that is center-right, is a locus composed of sound people … who in some 
respects express mild demands. They are conservatives, but they do not pay tribute to fanaticism. They are 
religious, but they do not like fanaticism. They stand at a distance from the state, they want to change [state] 
structure, but they do not even imagine damaging it. They adhere to their traditions, but they inherently have 
an enormous will to change. They want freedom, but they do not overlook the destruction of order. They have 
developed national sentiments, but they oppose ethnicity or racist nationalism. They are against state control 
over the economy, but they aspire to a regulatory state. They support democracy to the extent that it does not 
threaten the unity of the state” (Quoted in Sever 2002; cited in Coşar 2011). 
6
 Alongside with the women’s movement human rights organizations were started to be founded in the early 
1990s. What differentiated the women’s movement is that it has long manipulated the official approach to 
women’s issues as “apolitical” topics. 
7
 As of 2004 the name of the Directorate was changed to the General Directorate on the Status of Women 
(Kadının Statüsü Genel Müdürlüğü). 
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8
 The amendments to the Turkish Penal Code in 2004 is among the most pronounced legal amendments. The 
enactment of the İstanbul Convention (Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and 
Domestic Violence) in 2014 is a parallel development. However, these and the other amendments and legal 
regulations were managed side by side with conservative measures that ironically opt for delimiting feminist 
activism. 
9
 For a succint account of the conservative articulations into the neoliberal order through the appeals to 
personal morals, loyalty to traditions, and faithfulness see Dardot and Lavalle2012: 263-281. 
10
 In Turkey state funding for civil society organizations has always been limited. By the selective approach of 
the AKP feminist civil society organizations are among the most disadvantaged ones in this respect. 
Additionally, when one considers the fact that such actors of the civil societal sphere as platforms, initiatives 
and collectives, which constitute a considerable form of feminist organizing are not recognized as civil society 
organizations by the related laws, the financial bottleneck that most feminist organizations face becomes 
clearer. 
11
 Erdoğan does not refrain from outwardly stating his contention that men and women cannot be equal. In 
parallel, he has been outspokenly hostile to the feminists claiming gender equality by labeling them as “a 
bunch of marginal women… who do not comply with Turkish morality” (Cited in Yeğeneoğlu and Coşar 2012: 
197). This hostility is not restricted to Erdoğan’s personal opinion; it can also be observed at the institutional 
level. Thus, the Presidency of Religious Affairs explicitly denounces feminism with the contention that it 
“…leads to grave consequences in moral and social respects. … the woman who falls into the feminist 
movement… ignores many of the rules and values, which are indispensable for the family” (Cited in Yeğeneoğlu 
and Coşar 2012: 198). 
12
 Though the discussion concerns more the relation between civil society and democracy in the twenty-first 
century I think it is relevant for a further understanding of the state of civil society in Turkey. In the course of 
the original debate between Turner and Alexander, Turner is skeptical about the implications of civil society-as-
it-is in the twenty-first century for democracy, especially with regard to the pervasiveness of identity politics. 
Alexander insists on a more positive reading with a view to a balance between universalism and 
multiculturalism. 
13
 The report of the Balkan Civil Society Acquis defines the legal regulations in Turkey pertaining to civil society 
as tending to restriction rather than to freedom. In parallel, the report also points at the ambiguity in the 
regulations on state monitoring of the civil society organizations that risks arbitrary practices. This is especially 
relevant in the case of the Law on Meetings and Demonstrations. Although the right to organize meetings and 
demonstrations is recognized as a citizenship right, the wide discretionary powers of the police force, 
accompanied by secondary legislation—regulating the exceptional situations—almost nullifies the practice of 
the right (2014: 17).  
